

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

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TOP SECRET/SENSITIVE (XGDS)

October 31, 1973

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MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

PARTICIPANTS:

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Ismail Fahmi, Egyptian Foreign Minister  
Abdullah al-Erian, Egyptian Ambassador to France  
William B. Quandt, NSC Staff

DATE AND PLACE:

1:00 p.m. Wednesday, 31 October, 1973 in  
Secretary Kissinger's Office in the White House

F.M. Fahmi:

We were planning on meeting at two o'clock.

Sec. Kissinger:

That's right. Then you'll see the President at three.

F.M. Fahmi:

I have an urgent message from President Sadat that I thought you should see before I meet with the President.

Sec. Kissinger:

Thank you. [See attached text of President Sadat's message.]

F.M. Fahmi:

Let me explain that when we talk of participation by the parties we mean Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Israel and also Lebanon and the Palestinians.

Sec. Kissinger:

Why Lebanon?

F.M. Fahmi:

This has to do with a final settlement. Lebanon still has armistice lines with Israel. They should be included.

Sec. Kissinger:

This is a comprehensive settlement plan that you propose.

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DECLAS-Impossible to Determine Date.

BYAUTH-Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

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F.M. Fahmi: Yes, but it doesn't include all details. For example, it doesn't say anything about UN forces at Sharm al-Shaykh, or about Gaza, or about demilitarized zones. This is just a basic framework.

Sec. Kissinger: I assume you don't need any immediate reaction. The problems of the October 22 line seem most urgent. This is a complex proposal.

F.M. Fahmi: The agreement on the October 22 lines can be implemented.

Sec. Kissinger: I told you what I thought we could get from the Israelis. But we can't get an unlimited resupply of the Third Army.

F.M. Fahmi: I am not talking of unlimited resupply. I am talking of non-military resupply under the UN forces.

Sec. Kissinger: But only if Israel withdraws to the October 22 line.

F.M. Fahmi: That's right. The October 22 lines are also linked with the prisoner of war exchange.

Sec. Kissinger: On the broader proposals you have here, there are two ways of doing this. One is that we consider this as a package.

F.M. Fahmi: This is just the sequence of things.

Sec. Kissinger: I understand that. There are two possible approaches. One, we can work now immediately on the ceasefire lines, or we can deal with everything in a package.

F.M. Fahmi: This isn't a package. This is just the sequence of events.

Sec. Kissinger: The big problem is that if we recommend to Israel to return to the October 22 lines, we can only do this if you agree to non-military resupply of the Third Army.

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F.M. Fahmi: I agree to that, on a permanent basis, even after they return. I know what I am saying. But I want you to understand that it is not in the interest of the United States to tip the military balance in their favor.

Sec. Kissinger: We will oppose any Israeli offensive from the West Bank salient, no matter what the circumstances. We will do this before and after any outbreaks of fighting.

F.M. Fahmi: Can you guarantee that they will not budge from the October 22 lines?

Sec. Kissinger: You won't mind if they move back from those lines, will you? We will assure you that they will not move in an offensive against you from those lines.

F.M. Fahmi: Then the United States assures us that Israel will stay within the October 22 lines?

Sec. Kissinger: That's okay. The document you have given us has some possibilities for progress in it. We will have Prime Minister Meir here tomorrow. I will see her in the morning for breakfast, and the President will see her at noon. We can talk to her. But let's understand how we can proceed. We will say that Egypt agrees on a permanent basis that only non-military supplies will reach the Third Army under UN observation, once Israel has returned to the October 22 lines. Second, you agree that Israel and Egypt will exchange prisoners once Israel is at the October 22 lines. Third, we will give private assurances to Egypt that Israel will not launch any offensive beyond the October 22 lines if these arrangements are accepted.

F.M. Fahmi: You can't let the Israelis use ceasefire violations as an excuse to attack. There's a danger that they will create incidents in certain areas. The observers will not know of this unless we react, and if we react we will then be blamed for violating the ceasefire.

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Sec. Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, can you get the Soviets off my back? They are bringing me new schemes every day. They now say that both we and they have to send senior representatives to Cairo.

F.M. Fahmi: We have had some problems in communication.

Sec. Kissinger: We'll deal with this issue next Tuesday when I am in Cairo.

F.M. Fahmi: Prior to diplomatic relations, we want a senior representative in Cairo.

Sec. Kissinger: We will send one as soon after Tuesday as is possible. This has nothing to do then with the Soviet requests? They are always bringing me messages from Sadat. You can come directly to me.

F.M. Fahmi: The Soviets are not speaking on Sadat's behalf. I am the Foreign Minister.

Sec. Kissinger: We'll send a senior representative right after my visit. He will stay there until we name an ambassador.

F.M. Fahmi: We want a senior man in a proper sense, because he may have to deal with the President directly.

Sec. Kissinger: Okay. We'll send a senior man.

[REDACTED]

Sec. Kissinger: [REDACTED] But I c25X1 tell you that by the end of next week we will have a senior man in Cairo. Now, I've got to go. I have 25X1 people waiting. Come back at 2:30 and we can talk for fifteen minutes or so before you see the President. Then we will want to talk about my trip.

F.M. Fahmi: I'll be here tomorrow if you want to talk then.

WBZ.  
William B. Quandt

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